We recognize the need for centralized administration of Respondent's operation of its chain, but this factor is primarily administrative, and is not directly related to the Kankakee employees' interest in the appropriateness of their store as a separate unit. Thus, we have a situation where the employees of the Kankakee store constitute a separate cohesive group of employees having virtually no contact, community of interest, or relationship with employees of any of Respondent's other stores. In addition, there is no evidence of any employee interchange between the Kankakee store and any of the other stores within the chain including those stores nearest Kankakee in the Chicago metropolitan area. In addition to its geographic separation, the Kankakee store has its own store manager in charge of the routine daily operations including the initial hiring of stockboys, the making out of work schedules, and approving any requested or necessary schedule changes. The Kankakee store is located about 50 miles from the Chicago area and is from 50 to 100 miles away from the other three stores located outside the Chicago metropolitan area. The record shows that the Kankakee store is 1 store in a chain of 17 retail self-service shoe stores ġ3 of these stores are located in the Chicago metropolitan area while the other 3 are in Springfield, Decatur, and Pekin, Illinois.
BIGBEN SHOES TRIAL
We also disagree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that a one-store unit at Kankakee, Illinois, was inappropriate and that therefore Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act when it refused to recognize and bargain with the Union on August 3, 1967. Kelley's failure to testify does not in any way affect the weight of the General Counsel's evidence.Ģ. Kelley's statement to Dirker that his schedule was changed to force him to quit because of his union activity clearly falls within section 7(b) of the complaint and is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' As to the Trial Examiner's secondary conclusion that since Kelley did not testify the incident was not fully litigated, we note that Dirker's testimony is uncontradicted on the record, and there is no allegation that Kelley was not available to Respondent at the time of the hearing. Section 7(b) of the complaint clearly alleges a threat to 'constructively' discharge an employee for engaging in union activities. We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that Store Manager Kelley's statement to Dirker regarding Dirker's fall schedule was not within the ambit of the complaint and therefore did not constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, as modified herein.ġ.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a threemember panel. Thereafter, the Charging Party and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and briefs in support of their exceptions.
He also found that Respondent had not engaged in other alleged unfair labor practices and recommended dismissal of those allegations of the complaint. The Kostel Corporation, d/b/a Big Ben Shoe Store and Retail Clerks International Association,īy MEMBERS BROWN, JENKINS, AND ZAGORIA On February 29, 1968, Trial Examiner John F.įunke issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
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